Chapter V
Guidelines for Interpretation
of the WTO Covered Agreements
OUTLINE
I Introduction
II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
IV The Status of Legitimate Expectations in Interpretation
I Introduction
According to Art. 11 of the DSU, the panel's role is to “make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. In the previous chapter, we have examined the general standard of review labeled as “an objective assessment” regarding “the facts of the case”; clearly, for panels to fulfil appropriately their functions as designated in Art. 11 of the DSU, it is also indiscerptible to make such an objective assessment of “the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. Therefore, the interpretation issue of the covered agreements arises. In this section, the author will scrutinize guidelines for interpretation applied under the WTO jurisprudence.
To resolve a particular dispute, before addressing the parties' arguments in detail, it is clearly necessary and appropriate to clarify the general issues concerning the interpretation of the relevant provisions and their application to the parties' claims. However, the complex nature of the covered agreements has given rise to difficulties in interpretation.
As noted previously, GATT/WTO jurisprudence should not be viewed in isolation from general principles developed in international law or most jurisdictions; and according to Art. 3.2 of the DSU, panels are bound by the “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” in their examination of the covered agreements. A number of recent adopted reports have repeatedly referred, as interpretative guidelines, to “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” as embodied in the text of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘Vienna Convention’), especially in its Arts. 31, 32. It is in accordance with these rules of treaty interpretation that panels or the Appellate Body have frequently examined the WTO provisions at issue, on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the terms of those provisions in their context, in the light of the object and purpose of the covered agreements and the WTO Agreement. These Vienna Convention articles provide as follows:
“Art. 31: General Rule of Interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
Art. 32 Supplementary Means of Interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”
II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
Pursuant to Art. 31.1 of the Vienna Convention, the duty of a treaty interpreter is to determine the meaning of a term in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the term in its context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. As noted by the Appellate Body in its Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages (DS8/DS10/DS11), “Article 31 of provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: ‘interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty’. The provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions”. And in US ? Shrimps (DS58), the Appellate Body accordingly states: “A treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular provision to be interpreted. It is in the words constituting that provision, read in their context, that the object and purpose of the states parties to the treaty must first be sought. Where the meaning imparted by the text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or where confirmation of the correctness of the reading of the text itself is desired, light from the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole may usefully be sought.”
More specifically, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules that: “Text, context and object-and-purpose correspond to well established textual, systemic and teleological methodologies of treaty interpretation, all of which typically come into play when interpreting complex provisions in multilateral treaties. For pragmatic reasons the normal usage, and we will follow this usage, is to start the interpretation from the ordinary meaning of the ‘raw’ text of the relevant treaty provisions and then seek to construe it in its context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose. However, the elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object-and-purpose as well as good faith - are to be viewed as one holistic rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Context and object-and-purpose may often appear simply to confirm an interpretation seemingly derived from the ‘raw’ text. In reality it is always some context, even if unstated, that determines which meaning is to be taken as ‘ordinary’ and frequently it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at object-and-purpose. As noted by the Appellate Body: ‘Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: 'interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty'’. It adds, however, that ‘[t]he provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions’.” 1
In sum, as noted by the Panel in Canada-Automotive Industry (DS139/DS142), “understanding of these rules of interpretation is that, even though the text of a term is the starting-point for any interpretation, the meaning of a term cannot be found exclusively in that text; in seeking the meaning of a term, we also have to take account of its context and to consider the text of the term in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention explicitly refers to the ‘ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their [the terms'] context and in the light of its [the treaty's] object and purpose’. The three elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object and purpose - are to be viewed as one integrated rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Of course, context and object and purpose may simply confirm the textual meaning of a term. In many cases, however, it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at the context and/or object and purpose”. 2
With regard to Art. 32 of the Vienna Convention, it is repeatedly ruled that, “[t]he application of these rules in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention will usually allow a treaty interpreter to establish the meaning of a term. However, if after applying Article 31 the meaning of the term remains ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, Article 32 allows a treaty interpreter to have recourse to ‘... supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion’. With regard to 'the circumstances of [the] conclusion' of a treaty, this permits, in appropriate cases, the examination of the historical background against which the treaty was negotiated.” 3
As a whole, under the WTO jurisprudence, with regard to the dispute among the parties over the appropriate legal analysis to be applied, as general principles or guidelines of interpretation, it is often begun with Art. 3.2 of the DSU. To go further, as noted by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, “the ‘customary rules of interpretation of public international law’ are those incorporated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). GATT panels have previously interpreted the GATT in accordance with the VCLT. The Panel noted that Article 3:2 DSU in fact codifies this previously-established practice”. Consequently, “the Panel concluded that the starting point of an interpretation of an international treaty, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in accordance with Article 31 VCLT, is the wording of the treaty. The wording should be interpreted in its context and in the light of the object and the purpose of the treaty as a whole and subsequent practice and agreements should be taken into account. Recourse to supplementary means of interpretation should be made exceptionally only under the conditions specified in Article 32 VCLT”. 4
In short, it is may be the case that, it is generally considered that the fundamental rules of treaty interpretation set out in Arts. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention have attained the status of rules of customary international law. In recent years, the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body and WTO panels has become one of the richest sources from which to receive guidance on their application.
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
The Panel Report on Turkey-Textile and Clothing Products (DS34) states concerning the conflicts issue that: 5
“As a general principle, WTO obligations are cumulative and Members must comply with all of them at all times unless there is a formal ‘conflict’ between them. This flows from the fact that the WTO Agreement is a ‘Single Undertaking’. On the definition of conflict, it should be noted that: ‘… a conflict of law-making treaties arises only where simultaneous compliance with the obligations of different instruments is impossible. ... There is no conflict if the obligations of one instrument are stricter than, but not incompatible with, those of another, or if it is possible to comply with the obligations of one instrument by refraining from exercising a privilege or discretion accorded by another’.
This principle, also referred to by Japan in its third party submission, is in conformity with the public international law presumption against conflicts which was applied by the Appellate Body in Canada - Periodicals and in EC - Bananas III, when dealing with potential overlapping coverage of GATT 1994 and GATS, and by the panel in Indonesia - Autos, in respect of the provisions of Article III of GATT, the TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement. In Guatemala - Cement, the Appellate Body when discussing the possibility of conflicts between the provisions of the Anti-dumping Agreement and the DSU, stated: ‘A special or additional provision should only be found to prevail over a provision of the DSU in a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to a violation of the other provision, that is, in the case of a conflict between them’.
We recall the Panel's finding in Indonesia - Autos, a dispute where Indonesia was arguing that the measures under examination were subsidies and therefore the SCM Agreement being lex specialis, was the only ‘applicable law’ (to the exclusion of other WTO provisions): ‘14.28 In considering Indonesia's defence that there is a general conflict between the provisions of the SCM Agreement and those of Article III of GATT, and consequently that the SCM Agreement is the only applicable law, we recall first that in public international law there is a presumption against conflict. This presumption is especially relevant in the WTO context since all WTO agreements, including GATT 1994 which was modified by Understandings when judged necessary, were negotiated at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum. In this context we recall the principle of effective interpretation pursuant to which all provisions of a treaty (and in the WTO system all agreements) must be given meaning, using the ordinary meaning of words.’
In light of this general principle, we will consider whether Article XXIV authorizes measures which Articles XI and XIII of GATT and Article 2.4 of the ATC otherwise prohibit. In view of the presumption against conflicts, as recognized by panels and the Appellate Body, we bear in mind that to the extent possible, any interpretation of these provisions that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided.”
It is clearly implied by the ruling above that, in the WTO system, any interpretation of the covered agreements that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided. In this respect, as to WTO rules of conflicts, in the context that all WTO agreements were negotiated “at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum”, the principle of effective interpretation is recalled. What a principle is it?
As ruled by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverage (DS8/DS10/DS11), effective interpretation is a principle “whereby all provisions of a treaty must be, to the extent possible, given their full meaning so that parties to such a treaty can enforce their rights and obligations effectively…. this principle of interpretation prevents [the panel] from reaching a conclusion on the claims … or the defense …, or on the related provisions invoked by the parties, that would lead to a denial of either party's rights or obligations.” 6 This ruling is upheld by the Appellate Body when ruling that, “[a] fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation flowing from the general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31 is the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat). In United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, we noted that ‘[o]ne of the corollaries of the ‘general rule of interpretation’ in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility’.” 7
厦门市财政局、厦门市残疾人联合会关于印发《厦门市残疾人就业保障金使用管理办法》的通知
福建省厦门市财政局 厦门市残疾人联合会
厦门市财政局、厦门市残疾人联合会关于印发《厦门市残疾人就业保障金使用管理办法》的通知
厦财社〔2006〕56号
各有关单位：
根据《厦门市按比例安排残疾人就业实施办法》（厦府〔2006〕126号）文件的要求，残疾人就业保障金的具体使用和管理办法由市财政部门会同市残疾人联合会制定。现将《厦门市残疾人就业保障金使用管理办法》予以印发，请遵照执行。
二00六年十月十六日
厦门市残疾人就业保障金使用管理办法
根据《厦门市按比例安排残疾人就业实施办法》（厦府〔2006〕126号）文件的要求及有关规定，为了规范残疾人就业保障金（以下简称“保障金”）的使用管理，提高保障金使用效益，促进残疾人就业工作，推动我市残疾人事业的发展，特制定本办法。
第一章 总 则
第一条 保障金是经国务院批准，向未达到按比例安排残疾人就业的用人单位征收的，专项用于促进残疾人就业和保障残疾人基本生活的政府性基金。
第二条 保障金的使用管理原则
（一）收支平衡的原则 保障金预算编制必须坚持以收定支、收支平衡；
（二）专款专用的原则 保障金必须严格按照规定用途使用，不得挪作它用；
（三）务实、效益的原则 残疾人就业保障水平必须与经济社会发展水平相适应，保障金的使用，必须不断优化支出结构，提高资金使用效益，不断改善残疾人生产生活环境和提高参与社会生活能力；
（四）公平、普惠的原则 保障金使用必须体现公平公正性，凡是符合保障金扶助条件的残疾人都有平等享受的权利。
第三条 保障金收支纳入预算管理。保障金的使用管理实行财政专户储存，专款专用，其使用情况应接受审计等有关部门和社会监督。
第二章 保障金使用范围
第四条 补助残疾人参加职业培训与教育
（一）经残疾人户籍所在地县级以上残联及残疾人就业服务机构认定(下同)，参加职业培训、行业培训、特殊技能培训及种养业、家庭副业实用技术培训的费用补助；
（二）用人单位安排残疾人就业并进行各类岗位技能培训的经费补助；
（三）补助和奖励残疾人及贫困残疾人家庭子女为提高素质实现就业所接受教育的相关费用。
第五条 用人单位为安排残疾人就业所需设施、设备的购置及改造费用补助，主要对为方便残疾人就业，改善残疾人工作环境的无障碍设施和无障碍环境建设经费的补助。
第六条 用于扶持残疾人就业方面
（一）对残疾人自谋职业、残疾人集体从业、从事个体经营、从事种植业养殖业、手工业、家庭副业等自主创业项目的银行贷款贴息补助；
（二）对政府投资开发或社区开发的公益性就业岗位、企业为安排残疾人所开发的特殊就业岗位安排残疾人给予的工资性补贴支出；
（三）对集中安置残疾人就业的福利企业和超比例安排残疾人就业的企业或组织的扶持、补贴、奖励；
（四）对在促进残疾人就业工作中做出显著成绩的单位和个人的考核奖励。
第七条 用于残疾人社会保障方面
（一）对低收入残疾人缴纳的社会保险费用补助；
（二）对重残而无劳动能力、无生活来源、无监护人的残疾人进行生活救助；
（三）对残疾人因重大疾病、突发事件造成的生活困难实施救助；
（四）对农村贫困残疾人家庭参加新型农村合作医疗保险费用的补助；
（五）对经合法鉴定机构鉴定完全丧失劳动能力或大部分丧失劳动能力的参保居民，参加厦门市城镇居民医疗保险个人需缴纳费用的补助。
第八条 用于与残疾人就业的有关方面
（一）扶持、补助为恢复或补偿残疾人劳动就业功能而开展的残疾人“脑瘫”、“开智”、“启聪”的治疗、“抢救性训练”等有关费用；
（二）补助为恢复或补偿残疾人生理功能实现残疾人劳动就业所实施的“助视”、“助听”、“助行”、“矫治”、“复明”等项目有关费用；
（三）对残疾人就业指导、推荐、招聘、派遣、残疾人状况调查、体检、评估、鉴定及其他直接用于残疾人就业工作的经费开支，对残疾人就业服务机构的经费补助；
（四）委托地税部门征收保障金的相关征收业务经费。
第九条 用于残疾人事业的其他方面
（一）支付安排残疾人就业及与残疾人就业有关的综合服务设施建设和添置相关设备器材费用；
（二）补充残疾人福利基金，主要用于残疾人扶贫、救助、救急和残疾人事业中、长期发展规划项目建设经费；
（三）落实市委、市政府安排的为残疾人办实事的项目经费；
（四）经同级财政批准用于促进残疾人事业的其他方面开支。
第三章 监督与管理
第十条 保障金的使用必须纳入年度各级财政预算，严格按照预算程序，通过预算呈报和审批后下达使用预算。
第十一条 保障金的使用必须有明确的项目任务。各级残联应根据残疾人事业发展计划及年度工作任务，做好项目安排，组织好保障金预算编制。
第十二条 保障金的重大开支项目应进行可行性、经济性、效益性分析论证和项目审批；保障金使用项目涉及按规定须进行招标、审价和政府采购的，应严格按规定进行招标、审价和政府采购；涉及按规定须由国库统一支付的，应通过国库统一支付。
第十三条 保障金预算在执行过程中需要调整、追加预算或进行项目资金调剂的，须报经同级财政按规定程序批准。
第十四条 各使用单位应严格按照规定使用保障金，严格执行保障金预算。任何单位未经规定程序批准，不得变更支出用途，不得截留、挤占、平调、挪用保障金。
第十五条 各使用单位应建立保障金使用档案，自觉开展保障金使用情况的检查和评价工作，并将保障金的使用情况定期呈报同级残联和财政部门检查监督。
第十七条 残联和财政部门应加强对保障金使用情况的监督和管理，定期开展使用情况的审计跟踪和绩效考评，督促使用单位管好用好保障金。
第十八条 对违反本办法的单位，依照《财政违法行为处罚处分条例》给予严肃查处；对违反本办法的责任人，由所在单位或上级主管部门给予行政处分，构成触犯刑法的，依法追究刑事责任。
第四章 附则
第十九条 本办法自2006年6月1日起执行。
第二十条 本办法由市财政局和市残联负责解释。
